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Several economic models have described the theoretical causes and consequences of `credit rationing' and
`under-investment'; one string of this literature shows the long-run e®ects of initial wealth distribution
and entrepreneurial ability on the process of occupational choice and performance, and its consequences
on inequality. Surprisingly, there is very little micro-level evidence on the existence and e®ects of `credit
rationing' in the context of developing countries. This is the contribution of the current paper. Using a
survey of 4,553 entrepreneurs in 51 slums in Rio de Janeiro, this paper uses mean and quantile regression
estimates to shows the e®ects of the type of initial capital, credit constraints, and human capital factors on
entrepreneurs' performance. The main ¯ndings of the the paper are that entrepreneurs that were able to
self-¯nance their business start-up presented earnings 16% greater than entrepreneurs that had to borrow
their initial capital. In addition, entrepreneurs that explicitly claimed to be credit constrained performed
substantially worse than their observationally identical counterparts, even if they were credit worthy. Both,
initial source of funding and liquidity constraint presented greater e®ects on the highest quantiles. In terms
of human capital, the current study shows positive and statistically signi¯cant returns for both years of
schooling and experience, with higher returns on the lowest quantiles, indicating the potential role of these
factors on inequality reduction.
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Resumo
Diversos modelos econ^ omicos analisam os efeitos de longo prazo da distribui» c~ ao inicial da riqueza e da habil-
idade empreededora sobre o processo de escolha ocupacional e performance, bem como suas consequ^ encias
sobre a desigualdade. Surpreendentemente, existem poucas evid^ encias emp¶ ³ricas a respeito da exist^ encia
e dos efeitos do `racionamento de cr¶ edito' no contexto de pa¶ ³ses em desenvolvimento. Na tentativa de
preencher esta lacuna, o presente artigo, baseado numa amostra de 4553 empreendedores em 51 favelas do
Rio de Janeiro, realiza estima» c~ oes de quantil e OLS para mostrar os efeitos de fatores referentes ao tipo
de capital inicial, restri» c~ ao de cr¶ edito, e capital humano sobre a performance das empresas. Os resultados
obtidos indicam que empreendedores que foram capazes de auto-¯nanciar o in¶ ³cio de seus neg¶ ocios apresen-
taram ganhos 16% superiores aos ganhos daqueles que obtiveram empr¶ estimos. Al¶ em disso, empreendedores
que, explicitamente, alegaram possuir restri» c~ ao de cr¶ edito - mesmo estando habilitados, pela institui» c~ ao
¯nanceira, a receber cr¶ edito - obtiveram performance substancialmente pior do que o seu `grupo de controle'
determinado atrav¶ es de caracter¶ ³sticas observ¶ aveis. Os fatores referentes µ a fonte inicial de ¯nanciamento e µ a
restri» c~ ao de cr¶ edito apresentaram grandes efeitos nos quartis mais elevados. Em termos de capital humano,
o trabalho identi¯cou retornos estatisticamente signi¯cativos tanto para a vari¶ avel `anos de escolaridade'
quanto para a vari¶ avel `experi^ encia', com retornos maiores para os quantis menores, indicando o papel
potencial desses fatores na redu» c~ ao da desigualdade.
Palavras-chave: Mobilidade ocupacional, racionamento de crdito, pobreza urbana, de-
sigualdade de renda, e empreendedorismo
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Classificao JEL: J24, J44, J621 Introduction
Several models have described the theoretical causes and consequences of `credit rationing' and `imperfect
capital markets' in the economic literature. More importantly, growth theory have recently incorporate this
trait to generate models that explain economic growth at the expense of increasing inequality 1. We use
mean and quantile regression estimates to address the relation between entrepreneurs characteristics and
earnings inequality using micro-level data from urban slums that have experienced per capita income growth
with increasing inequality in the recent years2.
The structure of this paper draws from the recent work of Paulson and Townsend (2002) who empirically
distinguished the micro-economic foundations of two models of growth with increasing inequality using
household data from Thailand. As Paulson and Townsend, we will focus in two streams of the ¯nancial
constraints literature, namely, limited commitment and moral hazard models, explored, respectively, in the
work of Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Aghion and Bolton (1997).
The work of Banerjee and Newman (1993) has been one the seminal contributions to this debate. These
authors have shown the long-run e®ects of initial wealth distribution on the process of occupational choice
and subsequent sustained growth with inequality. The paper shows that in an economy with imperfect
credit markets, in which only individuals with previously accumulated wealth are able to borrow, economic
growth will happen at the expense of increasing wealth inequality, and individuals might fall into poverty
traps.
An alternative model was developed by Aghion and Bolton (1997). According to these authors, ¯nancial
constraints arise from moral hazard problems. Given that e®ort is unobserved and repayment is conditioned
to the project success, poor borrowers will face little incentive to be diligent, increasing the likelihood of
project failure and default. Hence, according to this model, low-wealth entrepreneurs who do succeed in
getting loans will be subject to a binding incentive compatibility constraint that ensures that they exert the
appropriate level of e®ort, and this limits credit for investment, increasingly so as wealth diminishes.
As Paulson and Townsend (2002) explain, both models share many predictions. Entrepreneurship will be
positively associated with pre-existing wealth. The long-run impact of ¯nancial constraint may be alleviated
through savings and growth. Moreover, both models allow for poverty traps, and even when poverty traps
are avoided, both models imply that economic growth will be accompanied by increasing inequality.
Why slums?
According to the 2000 Census, there are around 500 slums or `favelas' in city of Rio de Janeiro with a
total population of over 1 million inhabitants, or 19% of the total population of the city of Rio de Janeiro.
Moreover, the population living on these communities have grown at an average rate of 2.4% per year for
the past 10 years, while the average citywide growth is around 0.38% (IBGE, 2000). This facts illustrate
the growing importance of this communities on the social tissue of the city of Rio de Janeiro.
Unfortunately, such phenomena is by no means exclusive to the city of Rio de Janeiro. According to
a recent report from the United Nations Human Settlements Program, at least 1 billion people worldwide
currently live in urban slums (UN-HABITAT, 2003). Within 30 years, if current trends continue, one out
of every three people on the planet will live in such conditions.
Such trends only provide further evidences to the the urbanization of poverty, which is already a fact in
Latin America. Although poverty rates in the region are higher in rural areas than in urban areas (55% vs.
39%), in absolute terms there are more than twice as many urban poor than rural poor - 68 million rural
poor compared with 138 million urban poor (Cira, 2002).
In spite of the long tradition of well motivated micro-level studies on non-farming entrepreneurial activ-
ities in rural areas of developing countries (Bardhan, 1982; Pitt and Khandker, 1998; Eswaran and Kotwal,
1989; Wydick, 1999; Ferreira and Lanjouw, 2001)3, the entrepreneurial activities in deprived urban areas of
the same countries are often neglected.
Moreover, most of the very recent empirical literature on the relationship between wealth and entry into
entrepreneurship in developing countries have used national household surveys (Tejerina, 2003; Mesnard
1see Aghion et al. (1999) for a review of this literature.
2A feature also shared by Brazil (IBGE, 2003), and the metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro (Pero et al., 2004). Using
micro-level data from the census of 1991 and 2000, Pero et al. (2004) have shown that while the per capita income from the
city of Rio de Janeiro has grown 31% in this period, inequality, as measure by the Gini coe±cient has increased from 0.60 to
0.62, given the high initial value and the relative small variability of this index, this is a considerable change.
3Other authors that have discussed this this topic are GrazianodaSilva and Del Grossi (2001); Ruben and van den Berg
(2001); Corral and Reardon (2001); Yunez-Naude and Taylor (2001); Reardon et al. (2001); Escobal (2001); Lanjouw (2001).
1and Ravallion, 2003, 2001) or specially designed surveys that focus on rural and semi-rural areas (Paulson
and Townsend, 2002), which subsequently are not able to capture the speci¯cities of slum residents given
that those surveys often do not contain enough observations of households located in these communities. In
addition, most household surveys only collect information on the residence location, leaving the researcher
with no information on the business location of the entrepreneur. Moreover, most of these survey instrument
were not speci¯cally designed to sample entrepreneurs, thus do not collect any information of costs and
revenues from the enterprise.
This paper adds to this literature by providing micro-level evidence of the e®ects of the source of startup
funding and `credit constraints' on the earnings inequality of poor entrepreneurs in deprived urban areas.
This work uses a unique survey with detailed information on 4,453 entrepreneurs in 51 slums in the city of
Rio de Janeiro. This paper also contributes to this growing literature, by going beyond average e®ects, and
using quantile regressions to investigate e®ect di®erentials along to conditional earnings distribution. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the ¯rst paper to apply this estimation technique to this literature.
The present work is structured in six sections, including this introduction. The second section discusses
the existing theoretical predictions of models with `credit constraints', particular emphasis will be given to
the role of initial capital accumulation on business start-up. The following section presents the empirical
model used in the estimations of this paper. The fourth section brie°y describes the data use and some of
its summary characteristics of the surveyed population. The following section carries the empirical results.
The sixth and last section highlights the major ¯ndings of this work.
2 Theoretical Predictions:
The structure and interpretations of the models presented in this section follows closely the recent work of
Paulson and Townsend (2002).
As in the work of Paulson and Townsend, we describe the two theoretical models whose implications
will provide an outline for the interpretation of the empirical estimations of this paper.
Throughout the description of these models, the same symbols are used to label variables that are
common across models. For example, B always stand for wealth, k¤ will denote optimum amount of capital
to invest when households are unconstrained, and the parameter µ stands for entrepreneurial talent.
2.1 Description of Models
2.1.1 Limited Commitment Model
The ¯rst model that we analyze comes from Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and is closely related to Banerjee
and Newman (1993). This is a static model of occupational choice where households decide whether to work
in the wage sector or to become entrepreneurs. Evans and Jovanovic use this model to provide structural
estimates of the choice between wage work and entrepreneurship using U.S data.
Banerjee and Newman (1993) develop a dynamic version of this model, and ¯nd that economics growth
is likely to be accompanied by increases in inequality. This work was latter extended by Ghatak and Jiang
(2002), who further illustrate the e®ects of borrowing constraints on wealth inequality, illustrating the
possibility of poverty traps 4.
In this model, there no ¯xed start-up costs. However, the amount of capital that may be invested in
entrepreneurial projects may be limited because of credit market are incomplete.
Assuming that entrepreneurs can borrow only up to a multiple ° ¸ 1 of their initial assets, B, where °
is common to all individuals, the authors argue that entrepreneurs only have access to capital k 2 (0;°B).
This condition corresponds to a case of credit rationing, where banks are only willing to extend loans to
those with assets, up to a given asset-determined limit, irrespective of the interest rate entrepreneurs are
prepared to pay.
The amount of capital that an entrepreneurial household would like to invest k, is determined by en-
trepreneurial skill µ, nominal interest rate r, and a productivity parameter ®. With that in mind, the
entrepreneurs' incomes y is given by
y = µk® (1)
4Agents remain poor because they start poor.







Note that the optimal investment level, k¤, does depend on entrepreneurial talent, µ. As noted, house-
holds can borrow up to some ¯xed multiple of their total wealth, but not more. Therefore, the maximum
amount that can be invested in a ¯rm is equal to °B, and the maximum amount that can be invested in a
¯rm is equal to (° ¡1)B. Thus, borrowing constraints are more likely to bind for higher skilled households,
since business skills and capital are complements (Paulson and Townsend, 2002)5. It can be seen from
equation (2) that for a given level of wealth B, entrepreneurs will be unconstrained only if their talent is





Figure 1 illustrates this curve and de¯nes the boundary between constrained and unconstrained en-
trepreneurs as a function of wealth, B, and talent, µ. The area labeled 1a corresponds to those individuals
who do not have the talent nor wealth to satisfy the condition described above, hence they became wage
workers. The area labeled 1b illustrate the situation of those individuals who can became entrepreneurs
and are able to borrow or have su±cient wealth, to operate their business at the optimum level of capital,
given their relatively low level of talent, these are the unconstrained entrepreneurs. The area labeled 1c
correspond to those entrepreneurs that can not achieve their optimal level of capital for their talent, these
are the constrained entrepreneurs.










Figure 1: Nature of the selection into entrepreneurship
The two main prediction of Evans and Jovanovic (1989) model, as summarized by (Parker, 2004, pg.180),
are:
1. There is a positive relationship between the probability of entering entrepreneurship and assets prior
to entering entrepreneurship.
2. Wealthier entrepreneurs will operate larger enterprises, on average, than poorer ones and so will receive
higher incomes.
2.1.2 Moral Hazard
The structure and implication of the moral hazard model presented in this subsection comes from Paulson
and Townsend (2002), who preset an extended version of the Aghion and Bolton (1997) dynamic model of
occupational choice with limited information and incentives, as in the classic moral hazard problem.
Below follows a simpli¯ed model based on Aghion and Bolton (1997) and Lehnert (1998), extended with
entrepreneurial talent as a factor a®ecting the probability of success of the project in a similar way to that
in Paulson and Townsend.
5As Paulson and Townsend (2002) noted, while the demand of credit will clearly depend on entrepreneurial talent, the supply
of credit will respond only to wealth.
3The model consist of a continuum of risk neutral agents with wealth B and entrepreneurial talent, µ.
Each one of these agents can enter a project that requires a level of investment k = 1 and gives a payo®
according to the following functions:
P(k;p) =
(
r with probability pµ when k = 1;
0; with probability (1 ¡ pµ):
(4)
Where pµ is the probability of success of the project. This probability if in°uenced by entrepreneurial
talent µ and the level of e®ort p. Both p and µ can take values between 0 or 1. Given capital k = 1, if the






where cost is increasing in the size of the payo® of the project r, the level of e®ort p, and a is a parameter of
the function. When the agent's wealth is less than the amount needed to begin the project he will have to
borrow an amount (1 ¡ z), at the equilibrium rate of interest equal to ½(z). The ¯nancial intermediary will
supply credit if the borrower agrees to pay a rate of return ½(z) times the amount of money borrowed (1¡z)
if the project is successful and zero otherwise. Hence, the revenue function for the ¯nancial intermediary




½(z) with probability pµ;
0; with probability (1 ¡ pµ):
(6)
If the project succeeds the ¯nancial intermediary will get (1-z) times the equilibrium interest rate, if the
project fails it will get 0.









Expected utility will be equal to the payo® if the project is successful (r) times the probability of success
pµ, minus the amount to be repaid to the bank which is equal to the amount borrowed (1 ¡ z) times the
probability of success pµ and times the interest rate for the given level of wealth ½(z) and minus the disutility
of the e®ort C(p)








From this equation is possible to see that keeping ½(z) ¯xed, the optimal amount of e®ort is increasing
in wealth (i.e. the more people need to borrow in order to start the project the less e®ort they are willing to
make). The expected rate of return for the ¯nancial intermediary will be determined by the supply of funds.
Wealthy people will supply the part of the funds in excess of what they need to self-¯nance the project the
project and the poor who can not borrow and start projects will save their wealth.
Figure 2 describes who will become an entrepreneur and who will work for wages as a function of wealth
and talent. The likelihood of starting a ¯rm is zero for ¯rms with low wealth and low talent. For high
wealth, high talent households, the probability of starting a ¯rm is virtually one. If talent if ¯xed at some
intermediary level, the probability of entrepreneurship rises from zero to one with wealth. The intuition
of Figure 2, as in Aghion and Bolton and Lehnert, is that low wealth borrowers have little incentive to
work because the ¯nancial intermediary would take so much of their project returns when the project is
successful. The only way the ¯nancial intermediary can make up for this is by raising the e®ective interest
rate and at signi¯cant low wealth levels the market will clear with no borrowing at all.
In the example described in Figure 2, as in Aghion and Bolton and Lehnert, all ¯rms are capitalized at
k = 1, and therefore all entrepreneurs who have wealth, B, less than one must borrow. However, as wealth
increases, the need for borrowed funds will decrease, and it is possible that e®ort will be monotonically
4increasing in wealth, thus household with wealth in excess of one will invest all of the surplus funds in the
market. These households who have wealth will not rely in borrowed funds at all. When there is no risk
aversion, and therefore no demand for insurance, these households will experience no disincentive e®ect form
incomplete credit markets. These high wealth households will chose their own e®ort level optimally and run
¯rms that are not credit constrained. Or as Aghion and Bolton state
\The more individuals need to borrow in order to invest, the less incentives they have to supply
e®ort since they must share a larger fraction of the marginal returns from e®ort with lenders...
The very wealthy, who do not need to borrow in order to invest in their own project, supply
the ¯rst-best level of e®ort since they remain residual claimants on all returns from such e®ort."
(Aghion and Bolton, 1997, pg.156-7)
A ¯rm in the Aghion and Bolton and Lehnert moral hazard model and in the general moral hazard model
that Paulson and Townsend developed, will be constrained by the moral hazard e®ect in credit markets if the
incentive constraint on e®ort is binding. In other words, ¯rms will be constrained if they have an incentive
to shirk and this incentive in turn in°uences the information-constrained contract.
In this model, each household has a technology for producing output q from its own e®orts z and from
capital k. This technology is written P(qjz;k), the probability of achieving output q given e®ort z and
capital, k = 1.









Figure 2: Restricted version of Aghion and Bolton/Lehnert Model
Policy recommendations consistent with limited commitment models will be related to reducing trans-
action costs and improving the quality of collateral, and policies consistent with moral hazard models will
be to improve the veri¯cation of e®ort in projects (joint liability groups or credit bureaus).
3 Empirical estimation:
Both models in Section 2 illustrated the importance of entrepreneurial talent, wealth and liquidity constraint
on entrepreneurs choice6 and performance. In what follows, we will try to empirically investigate the e®ects
of these factors using micro-level data from entrepreneurs in the slums of Rio.
Unfortunately, as in the case of most empirical studies, we do not have direct measures of the variables
discussed in our theoretical section. Thus, a few proxy variables will have to be used.
In terms of wealth, we will be using information regarding the initial source of funding of these en-
trepreneurs. Regrettably, this will be a categorical variable, which will indicate if the entrepreneur has
either self-¯nanced, borrowed or did not need initial capital on their business start-up. Our assumption here
is that those entrepreneurs that were able to self-¯nance their start-up had enough previously accumulated
wealth relative to the operation needs of their business start up. Our hypothesis here, based on the models
6For a discussion of the occupational choice aspect of these models please see Azevedo (2004) who uses the household module
of this survey to investigate, among other things, the determinants of entrepreneurial choice for the residents of the slums of Rio
de Janeiro. Household assets are proxy by house ownership and an asset index. The analysis shows a positive and statistically
signi¯cant `asset' e®ect on decision of becoming an entrepreneur (with increasing returns), in particular for those operating
informal enterprises. As argued above, this prediction has particularly important implications for developing countries, as it
reinforces inequality and makes it much harder for destituted entrepreneur to break from their poverty cycle.
5presented in Section 2, is that entrepreneurs that were able self-¯nance their start-up will perform better,
given the stronger incentives that they will have to put more e®ort in their enterprise, and the smaller degree
of `liquidity constraint' that they face.
Another important variable in our empirical model is a proxy for `liquidity constraint'. To classify
an entrepreneur as being constrained, we used their response to the question `What are the the biggest
di±culties faced by our enterprise?'. Those entrepreneurs that answered `lack of funds' were classi¯ed as
being constrained. This proxy is far form optimal, but it would be hard to improve without observing the
production function and talent of the individual entrepreneurs. It is important to note that claims by survey
respondents should be treated with great caution. As Parker (2004, pg.179) reminds us, such answers are
prone to self-serving bias whereby entrepreneurs might blame banks for inherent shortcomings, and do not
necessarily mean that loans were not available to these respondents (they might not be credit worthy) 7.
Another possible, and well deserved, criticism of this measure, is the fact that not all `credit constrained'
individuals are credit worthy. In order to control for this, we also included an interaction term in our model
between `having taken a loan in the past 12 months' and our proxy for being `liquidity constrained'.
On regard to talent we included all human capital variables at our disposal, such as education, experience,
training and age, which we believe are correlated to talent, and should allows us to proxy for this e®ect
(other authors such as Paulson and Townsend (2002) and Tejerina (2003) have followed a similar route).
Another important variable in our analysis is the enterprises' level of physical assets. This variable is
particularly important given the knowledge that entrepreneurs also obtain part of their returns through the
remuneration of their enterprises's assets. In order to construct this variable, we combined three variables
form the questionnaire, namely, the value of the building in which the enterprise is located (as reported by
the entrepreneur) and the average monthly expenses of the enterprise on fuel and machinery equipment8.
In this paper we will estimate a reduced form of earnings regression following a standard Mincer equation
(Mincer, 1958, 1974), under Becker (1964) framework:
Yi = ® + Xi¯ + Di¹ + Ei´ + Gi¼ + Wi± + Li· + Ci! + INT : (Li £ Ci)Á + INT : (Ii £ Ci)o + "i (9)
where
² Yi is the entrepreneur i earning;
² ® is a constant term;
² Xi is a vector of productivity enhancing characteristics following standard human capital theory, such
as: education; labour market experience; experienced squared; and, training;
² Di is a vector of demographic characteristics such as: gender; and, age;
² Ei is a vector os enterprise speci¯c characteristics, such as: sector; value of physical assets; value of
physical assets squared; registration; physical capital expansion in the past 12 months; and, use of
account controls;
² Gi is a vector of geographical factor, such as: neighborhood average income and distance to the center
of the city;
² Wi is a categorical variable that indicates if the entrepreneur i had enough accumulated wealth to
self-¯nance his business start-up, or if he had to borrow funds or if he did not need seed money9 (this
variable tries to capture the e®ect B in Section 2);
² Li shows if the enterprise i has taken a loan in the past 12 months;
² Finally, Ci is a dummy variable that shows if entrepreneur i claimed to be `credit constrained' by
pointing lack of funds as one of the main di±culties of his enterprise;
² INT denotes the interaction term between liquidity constrain and credit (Li and Ci), and credit and
investment in the past 12 months (Ii and Ci);
² "i is an error term representing unobservables determinants of earnings;
7Although these are quite plausible arguments, it must be bear in mind the `hostile' environment in which this entrepreneurs
operate. As we discussed in the previous section section only 9% of our sample took a loan to start-up their business, out of
which only 0.34% did so through a formal ¯nancial institution.
8The assumption made here is that the monthly expenses in fuel and machinery are proportional to the level of physical
capital in the enterprise.
9The Self-¯nance category is omitted and will be used as the reference criteria
6² ¯, ¹, and ´ are coe±cient of vectors denoting the the marginal e®ects in monetary terms of their
associated factors;
² ¼ is a vector of coe±cients that illustrate the e®ects neighborhood externalities on these entrepreneurs
performance and proxy their transportation costs;
² ± show the e®ect of previously accumulated wealth on current business performance;
² ! shows performance di®erential of those enterprises that currently claim to be 'credit rationed';
² · portraits the average e®ect of having taken a loan in the past 12 months; and,
² Á and o illustrate the combined e®ect of having taken a loan and claiming to be `credit rationed' and
having taken a loan and having invested in the past 12 months.
We estimated this model using both ordinary least squares (OLS) and quantile regression. The main
di®erence between the two methods is that the former is based on the mean of the conditional distribution of
the regression's dependent variable. An implicit assumption in this estimation is that possible di®erences of
the exogenous variables along the conditional distribution are unimportant. Unlike OLS, quantile regression
models allow for a full characterization of the conditional distribution of the dependent variable (Koenker
and Bassett, 1978).
In our setting, the quantile regression model can be written as
Yi = Xi¯¿ + u¿i; with Quant¿(YijXi) = Xi¯¿ (10)
where Xi is the vector of exogenous variables and ¯¿ is a vector of parameters 10. Quant¿(YijXi) denotes
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½¿(Yi ¡ Xi¯¿); (12)
where ½¿(") is the check function de¯ned as ½¿(") = ¿" if " ¸ 0 or ½¿(") = (¿ ¡ 1)" if " < 0.
The least absolute deviation (LAD) estimator of ¯ is a particular of this model, when ¿ = 0:5 (the
median regression). The ¯rst decile is obtained by setting ¿ = 0:1 and so on. As ¿ increases from 0 to 1, we
obtain the entire distribution of Y , conditional on X.
Another important characteristic of this method is its robustness to distributional assumptions. The
estimates and the associated inference apparatus have an inherent distribution-free character since quantile
estimations is in°uenced only by the local behavior of the conditional distribution of the response near the
speci¯ed quantile (Koenker and Bassett, 1978, 1982).
In summary, in contrast to mean regression models, quantile regression models impose less restriction
on the data, are robust to outliers in the data and provide more complete information on conditional
distributions of dependent variables.
The application of quantile regression has not been fully explored by the entrepreneurship literature.
In so doing, it has left unaddressed the possible impact of schooling, experience, wealth, and liquidity con-
straint upon inequality through its within-levels inequality component. For example, if experience earnings
increment were the same across the wage distributions of wages conditional on di®erent levels of experience
would di®er only on their location and not on their dispersions. However, it might be the case that these
dispersion do indeed vary across experience levels, thus resulting in an impact of experience upon the wage
distribution, through its within-levels channel. This is the possibility we test by using quantile regression
estimates (Martins and Pereira, 2004).
Endogeniety
A potential problem that has been pointed out repeatedly in the literature (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989;
Parker, 2004) is the correlation between ex ante wealth and entrepreneurial talent independently from the
10Both of which summarize the explanatory variables and their respective coe±cients described in Model (9).
7future ownership of a household business. The idea is that the existence of omitted variables might bias the
results, and erroneously attribute the e®ect of higher entrepreneurial talent on wealth to the e®ect of wealth
on entrepreneurship. This would mean that, to the extent that entrepreneurial talent and non-business
wealth are correlated, if we ¯nd a positive and signi¯cant relationship between wealth and entrepreneurship,
the reason might be not that households need to save prior to starting a business but, that households that
will eventually open a business will have higher returns both as wage earners and as entrepreneurs and
therefore will accumulate more wealth.
Having said this, it is important to note that the empirical evidence has not found conclusive evidence
that there exist a positive relationship between these two variables 11.
Before we discuss the empirical results of our model estimations, we will brie°y discuss the data used as
well as some of its main summary characteristics.
4 Data and Summary Statistics
The data analyzed in this study was obtained from a survey carried out by the auspices of the municipality
of Rio de Janeiro between January/1998 and March/2000. The survey covered households and enterprises
in 51 out of the 462 slums in the city of Rio de Janeiro at the time of survey. The survey had two modules
which were carried out independently: household (PCBR-Dom) and enterprises (PCBR-Est). The data from
both modules was collected through face-to-face interviews conducted by enumerators and ¯eld supervisors
trained by the Brazilian National School of Statistics (ENCE) which is part of the Brazilian National O±ce
of Statistics (IBGE). The households module followed a questionnaire similar to the World Bank LSMS12
and covered a sample of 21,704 households in 51 slums. The enterprise module is a census of all the 4,553
business establishments located in these slums. This was one the most extensive e®orts to map these
communities13. A full description of the survey is contained in Silva et al. (1998). The current study only
uses the data of the enterprise module (PCBR-Est).
This study also uses two complementary data sets, namely the 2000 Census (IBGE, 2000) and the 1996
geographical boundaries of the slums and neighborhoods of the city of Rio de Janeiro (LabGeo, 1996b,a).
The 2000 Census data was used to generate average incomes for each neighborhood where the analyzed
slums are located at. The goal of this variable is to capture geographical e®ects that might arise from slums
nearby more a²uent neighborhoods.
The data from the 1996 geographical boundaries of the slums and the city of Rio de Janeiro was used
to generate distance measures from the centroids of each slum to downtown Rio, in order to control for
transportation e®ects that might a®ect the entrepreneurs performance in each of these communities.
Most of the variables were computed directly from the replies to the survey questionnaire. Due to
the time di®erences of the data collection, the consumer price index of the metropolitan region of Rio de
Janeiro's city was used to de°ate all the monetary values in the survey to prices of March of 2000.
This survey follow the ILO/UN employment categories which include employees, unpaid family helpers,
employers and own account workers. An employer is a person who operates his/her own economic enterprise
or engages independently in a profession/trade and hires one or more employees. An own account worker14
is a person who operates his/her own economic enterprise or engages independently in a profession/trade
11Evans and Jovanovic (1989) assume the following relationship as part of a structural model of occupational choice: lnµi =
±0 + ±1lnzi + ´i where µi is entrepreneurial talent for agent i, and zi is the level of wealth in the beginning of the period.
Using data from the PSID they ¯nd that ±i has a negative value. Paulson and Townsend (2002) estimated the parameters of a
similar model using data for Thailand and including years of education of the head of household as an independent variable, and
found that the relationship between wealth and talent may be positive, though the estimate of this parameter is small and very
imprecise or negative at some points of the sample. They also found a comparatively much stronger and positive relationship
between the years of education of the head of the household and the entrepreneurial talent.
12The Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) was established by the World Bank in 1980 to explore ways of improving
the type and quality of household data collected by government statistical o±ces in developing countries. The objectives of
the LSMS were to develop new methods for monitoring progress in raising levels of living, to identify the consequences for
households of current and proposed government policies, and to improve communications between survey statisticians, analysts,
and policymakers.
13The selection criteria used to include each community in the survey sample was its involvement in a housing and infrastruc-
ture program from the municipality of Rio (for more details see Riley et al. (2001) and AciolyJr. (2001)). The 1998/2000 phase
of this program prioritized small and medium size slums with already some infrastructure, leaving the most challenging and
destitute communities out. If anything, the existing anecdotal evidence seems to suggests that these communities are among
the least problematic, and should be interpreted as an upper boundary of the reality of slums in Rio de Janeiro.
14Also referred as self-employed.
8and hires no employees. Following the existing literature, this paper uses employers and own account as
working de¯nition of entrepreneurs (see Parker (2004) and Le (1999)).
The description of the variables used in this study are de¯ned below (Table 4), as well as a brief discussion
of the main summary statistics of the survey.
Summary statistics
Most of the enterprises in the survey were on the service sector, followed by commerce and industry.
Most of the entrepreneurs were men (55%), the average age was 41 years old, with 6 years of schooling
(equivalent to incomplete Primary Education). 90% of the entrepreneurs reside in the slums where their
business is located.
A few interesting remarks emerge from the analyzes of the type of expenses of the enterprises. While 94%
of the entrepreneurs alleged expenses with employees, only 11% of them said that they have expenses with
their employees social security, suggesting that a substantial proportion of their employees are irregular wage
earners with no pension's right. Moreover, less than 3% of these entrepreneurs stated that they have taxes
related expenses. This ¯gure is even smaller than the proportion of registered enterprises (7%). According
to a legal de¯nition of the informal sector, these results suggest that around 93% to 97% of the enterprises
in these communities operate at the fringes of the formal economy15.
In terms of ¯nance, some ¯ndings should also be mentioned. First, only 55% of these enterprises have
some sort of accounting controls. In addition, 82% of these enterprises self-¯nanced their start-up16, while
9% took a loan, and 9% did not use any sort of seed money.
On regard of credit use only 12% of these enterprises have taken a loan, most of them in the past 12
months (8.8%). A much more interesting picture emerge as we look at the sources of ¯nance; surprisingly,
almost 70% of the credit used by these entrepreneurs originated from formal ¯nancial system. If anything,
this latest ¯nding suggest two things. First, slums are not homogenous environment as one might initially
imagine. Second, the depth of outreach of the Brazilian formal ¯nancial sector might be a lot greater than
initially argued by other authors (Schoenberg, 2000).
A table with the discussed summary statistics and the variable descriptions can be found in the appendix.
Some of the biggest di±culties of empirical studies on entrepreneurship are associated with the de¯nition
of earnings. Consequently, this paper considers two alternative measures to assess the robustness of the
comparisons made below. It useful to bear in mind that the measurement of earnings begins with the
identity:
Net Pro¯tt ´ Revenuest ¡ Expensest = Drawt + Retained earningst (13)
Equation (13) shows that the net pro¯t generate by a business in year t, given by the di®erence between
revenues and expenses (including depreciation), may be withdraw from the business by the entrepreneur in
the form of salary (termed the draw) or reinvested in the business (termed retained earnings). Many issues
arises as researchers try to compute any of these measures. Often, net pro¯t is underreported, both for tax
purposes and because its construction demands from the respondent a much stronger accountancy control of
his/her business. This latter point deserves particular attention on this study, given the already mentioned
fact that only 55% of the respondents have some sort of account control. Because the draw is a more direct
measure of earnings, in general it su®ers less from underreporting error and is regarded by the literature as
a superior measure of entrepreneurs income, in comparison to net pro¯t.
It is also known that an entrepreneur investing in his business may report a low draw (Hamilton (2000)).
However, the survey used in this study did not collect any information on the variation of the business
equity; thus, it is impossible to construct an equity adjusted draw.
Hence, data limitation hindered construction of two alternative measures of earnings for the entrepreneurs
in this study. The draw measure is available for virtually all business owner (99%), whereas the net pro¯t17
variable is available for approximately 97% of the total sample.
Another important source of bias on studies on entrepreneurship arises from the failure to properly deal
with negative incomes or pro¯ts (Parker, 2004, pg.13). Although there were no entrepreneurs that stated a
negative draw, the same did not happen with pro¯ts, around 50% of the ¯nal sample presented net losses.
15Following a more legalistic de¯nition of formal economy, as in De Soto (1989).
16There is plenty of empirical evidence to suggest that this is the case even on developed countries (i.e. 60% of start-up
business in Britain use self-¯nance (Parker, 2004, pg.137))
17Total Revenue - (Expenses in: Raw Material, Labor, Social Security, Rent, Machines & Equip., Fuel, Public Utilities, Taxes,
and Others)
9Thus, in order to be able to build a more complete picture, and given the fact that both variables were
relatively normally distributed (as it can be seen in Figure 13), we chose not to apply the usual logarithmic
transformation on our dependent variables.
Once all relevant variables with missing values are dropped from the analysis (age is the main variable
with missing values), we obtain a ¯nal sample of 4,026 and 3,949 (for draw and net pro¯t, respectively) or
roughly 90% of original sample. After further consideration, we also choose to drop the outliers below the
1% and above the 99% percentile of both the draw and net pro¯t distribution, this choice further reduced
the sample size to 3,825, or 86% of our original sample.
As Figure 13 illustrates, the net pro¯t ranges from a net loss of approximately R$2,000 to a net gain
of a similar magnitude. On the other hand, the draw distribution only assumes positive values, suggesting




































Figure 3: Empirical distributions, monthly earnings measures
5 Empirical Results
As discussed in Section 3 we estimated Model (9) through OLS and Quantile Regression, using both net
pro¯t and draw as dependent variables. The partial derivatives of the coe±cients for the earning function
estimates are presented in Tables 2 and 318. The Tables show the OLS estimates and the quantile regression
estimates for the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th quantiles 19 and respective robust standard errors20. A
Wald test for the null hypothesis of equality of the coe±cients across the quantiles is decisively rejected
for both the net pro¯t and the draw estimates, suggesting considerable variation in the coe±cients at the
di®erent points in the earnings distribution.
In order to test of multicollinearity among the regression coe±cients we calculate the variance in°ation
factors (VIFs) for the independent variables used in the model. Kutner et al. (1990) suggest that a VIF
value greater than 10 is an indication of potential multicollinearity problems. All regressor in our model
presented a VIF smaller than the above mentioned threshold 21.
One general result is that the model using draw as dependent variable ¯tted the data much better than
the one using net pro¯t; this was expected given the much wider dispersion of the dependent variable in the
latter case. Most variables on the draw model were statistically signi¯cant at the 99% level and presented
the expected sign. Moreover, all variables that were statistically signi¯cant in both models presented the
18The marginal e®ects were numerically computed using the partial elasticity of the form
@ log y
@x . Given this formula it is not
possible to estimate the partial derivatives for the quantile in which the dependent variable is negative. Thus, on the net pro¯t
equation (Table 3), we are only able to present the partial derivatives for the 50
th, 75
th, and 90
th quantile. A Table with all
the original coe±cients can be obtained upon request.
19Figures ??, ??, 4, and 5, in the appendix, provide a concise visual summary of the results of both estimations. The lightly
shaded region in each panel represents a 95 pointwise con¯dence band for each coe±cient. The OLS and respective con¯dence
band are also plotted.
20Huber/White/sandiwhich for OLS estimates and quantile regression standard errors were estimated using bootstrap resam-
pling with 200 replications.
21We did have an earlier speci¯cation that included a non-linear term for education, however the inclusion this this term
made the VIF value of both education and education square became greater than 10, subsequently we choose not to use this
speci¯cation.
10same sign. In what follows, we will comment in greater detail the coe±cients of the model using draw as
dependent variable (Table 2). The partial derivatives of the net pro¯t equation are presented in Table 3 and
Figure 4 in the appendix.
Education and Experience
In terms of human capital, the model shows returns to years of schooling of 3.6% per year. Although
these result are bellow the ¯ndings of the literature on returns to education of wage earners in Latin America
22, they are well within the boundaries of a recent survey on the entrepreneurial literature in developing
countries which showed returns around 5% (Van Der Sluis et al., 2003). Moreover, this ¯nding is very close
to the latest estimation of returns to education for Brazil 23.
Experience and experience square, in this case measured as actual years of labour market experience,
also showed the expected magnitudes and signs, with entrepreneurs earning around 3.4%, with decreasing
returns, in the case of draw, and 7.1% in the case of net pro¯ts.
The quantile estimators for both education and experience proved to be quite revelling (Fig5a and Fig5b
in the appendix). Both returns (schooling and experience) proved to be substantially higher on the lowest
quintile, with each additional year of schooling yielding 4.5% on the 10th quintile versus 3.1% on the 90th
quintile. For experience this di®erence is even greater, dropping from 7.7% on the 10th quintile versus
2.7% on the 90th quintile. In other words, low-skilled entrepreneurs (individuals who receive lower monthly
earnings conditional on their characteristics) are associated with a stronger human-capital related earnings
increment.
Such ¯ndings are quite important since it suggests that in the case of the entrepreneurs of the slums of
Rio, both education and experience can play an important role in reducing earnings inequality.
Although these ¯ndings are in direct contrast with the quantile estimations presented by Arabsheibani
et al. (2002) for Brazil using 1998 data24, and Martins and Pereira (2004) who used data from 16 developed
countries, these results are with consistent several arguments found in the the literature. We put forward a
few possible explanations for this result.
If low-earnings is positively correlated with low-capital (entrepreneurs that have not being able to invest
in physical capital), it is not surprising that the returns to education decreases on the higher quantiles,
given that the higher we move on the earnings distribution, the more likely it is that the entrepreneur's
earnings will also consist on returns to physical capital. Thus, this result might provide further evidence
for the argument that returns for schooling for entrepreneurs if lower because part of its remuneration is
through returns for capital. Smith and Metzger (1998) and Teilhet-Waldorf and Waldor (1983) also ¯nd
higher returns to education to urban low-skilled low-paid entrepreneurs in Mexico and Thailand.
Another evidence of this line of argument is the coe±cient `expansion' which indicates if the enterprise has
made or not any investment in physical capital in the past 12 months. As we can see, although this indicator
was not statistically signi¯cant in the lowest quantiles, in presented a large and statistically signi¯cant e®ect
on the highest quantiles, suggesting that entrepreneurs on the highest levels of the conditional distribution
presented substantially higher returns whenever they were able to expand their physical capital.
Many authors have argued that entrepreneurs success is likely to depend on numerous factors other than
formal education (Lazear, 2003; Parker, 2004, pg.20-21). Thus, if we take earnings as a measure of success,
low-skill entrepreneurs might have a higher return to education because they are not `jacks-of-all-trade',
thus not presenting the `extra' characteristics that might explain a successful entrepreneur, and which will
yield a return.
An alternative explanation relies on the existence of capital market imperfections. In perfect competi-
tion, capital would °ow from less productive to more productive individuals. The existence of such strong
productivity di®erential along the earnings distribution might indicate that capital markets are not working
properly. If credit is scarce and costly, low-earnings but high productivity entrepreneurs will be trapped in
a vicious cycle of poverty, in spite of their high productivity.
A more standard explanation is that returns of the more scarce resource should be higher. If low-earnings
is associated with low-human capital it should not came as a surprise that the rate of return of human capital
22In a recent survey Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) show that the average return to education for middle income countries
is 8.2% and that for Latin America and the Caribbean as a whole is 12%.
23Arabsheibani et al. (2002) using the 1998 wave of the national household survey, found returns for years of schooling of
4.1%.
24In their work, the showed that returns to years of schooling increase from 1.9% on the 10
th quintile versus 7.4% on the
90
th quintile, and earnings for each additional year of experience increased from 4.2% on the 10
th quintile to 6.7% on the 90
th
quintile.
11if higher at the lower end of the income distribution.
A ¯nal important issue concerns the possible impact of endogeneity on the results presented. If high
entrepreneurial ability individuals are over-represented in low schooling levels (because these individuals
realize at a very early age that formal education would not help them 25), then not considering ability
di®erences would wrongly lead to an overestimate(underestimate) of the returns to schooling at lower (upper)
part of the conditional distributions.
Gender and Age
In accordance with the previous literature, this paper also shows that female entrepreneurs earn sub-
stantially less than their male counterparts (around 30% less). Some of the existing empirical evidence
seems to suggest that women have greater opportunities or preferences for potentially less remunerative
home working, giving their often unequal responsibility for the children and for the household management
(Parker, 2004, pg.127-8). In terms of quantile e®ects, it seems that gender discrimination decreases on the
higher quintile, suggesting that this variable might play a signi¯cant role the increase of earnings inequality
(Fig5e).
Age presented small and negative and statistically signi¯cant e®ects on entrepreneurs draw. This e®ect
has remained relatively constant throughout the di®erent quantiles. Alternative speci¯cations were tested
without the age and with a non linear term for age, with no substantial e®ects on remaining coe±cients.
Business Characteristics
Current enterprise assets presented positive and statistically signi¯cant e®ects on entrepreneur's earnings,
with diminishing returns. Both coe±cients on Tables 2 and 3 have been multiplied by R$10,000 in order to
simplify interpretation. For every R$10,000 in assets, the entrepreneur's earnings increase on average 14.3%.
Again, the quantile estimation yield interesting results, showing that return on assets were insigni¯cant on
the 10th quantile, and positive and statistically signi¯cant returns on the remaining quantiles at a growing
rate (Fig5f).
The lack of registration and account controls had a negative and statistically signi¯cant relationship
on both models. One interesting factor is that this neither one of this variable presented a statistically
signi¯cant e®ect on the 10th quantile, and presented an increasing detrimental e®ect as we moved the the
higher quantiles of the earnings distribution (Fig5k and Fig5l).
Business Location
The neighborhood e®ect presented a positive and statistically signi¯cant e®ect. For each R$100 increase
on the average neighborhood income, entrepreneurs earnings would increase by 1%.
It is important to notice that the neighborhood average income of the slums in our sample ranges from
R$203 to R$1685, with a mean ¯gure of R$562 and a standard deviation of R$313. Thus, holding everting
else constant, the e®ect of moving an entrepreneur from a slum in the poorest neighborhood in our sample
to a slum in the wealthiest neighborhood can have a net e®ect on earning of the magnitude of 14.8%26.
This e®ect was also statistically signi¯cant for the 25th, 50th and 75th quantiles, and is twice larger for
entrepreneurs on the 25th quantile (Fig5o).
Start-up funding
The coe±cients of source of start-up funding suggest that the earnings of entrepreneurs that have taken a
loan are on average 16% lower than those entrepreneurs that have self-¯nanced their start-up. This ¯gure is
even lower than the earnings di®erential of the entrepreneurs that did not need seed money, whom presented
earnings 11% smaller. Both models presented in Section 2 can help us understand this result.
If we interpret that entrepreneurs who are able to self-¯nance their start up as those entrepreneurs that
have enough previously accumulated wealth to meet the minimum capital requirements of their business
start up - as discussed in the model of Aghion and Bolton and Lehnert presented in Section 2. Then,
the substantially worse performance of lenders can be explained as an e®ort problem, given that low wealth
borrowers have little incentive to work because the ¯nancial intermediary would take so much of their project
returns when the project is successful.
In addition, the superior performance of those entrepreneurs that had initial wealth can also be explained
with Evans and Jovanovic model, who argue that wealthier entrepreneurs (in our case de¯ned as those that
were able to self-¯nance their start-up) will operate larger enterprises, on average, than poorer ones (de¯nes
that borrowers and those that did not need any seed money), and will receive higher incomes, as our data
has shown.
25Parker (2004, pg.20) discuss the ¯ndings of some authors that argue that formal education might be detrimental to en-
trepreneurial spirit.
260:0001£ R$1,485
12One extra point is that most of these entrepreneurs have borrowed funds from family and friends, such
informal sources of ¯nance are characterized by a strong screening, monitoring and enforcing mechanisms
(Robinson, 2001, Chapter 6)27. This quali¯cation adds another dimension to this results, since it shows the
potential of informal contracts in such communities.
Another interesting ¯nding is that such di®erences on start-up funding were not statistically signi¯cant
in the lowest quantiles of the earnings distribution (both coe±cients were statistically insigni¯cant on the
10th quantile), suggesting this factors only become binding as the current earnings of the entrepreneurs
increase (Fig5t and Fig5u).
In Table 1 we brie°y focus on the returns to human and physical capital for the individuals on these
three di®erent status. It is clear that the entrepreneurs that did not use any source of initial capital are
also the ones with the highest returns to education (5.3%). Moreover, females that did not use any source
of initial capital, presented much higher return to years os schooling than males, 6.7% compared to 0.8%.
This results, seems to reinforce our discussion that entrepreneurs with low-capital, such as the ones that
did not need any capital investment to start up their enterprises should have higher returns to years of
schooling given human capital is the only assets at their possession that they are being remunerated for. It
is important to acknowledge that these results might also be driven by the omission of entrepreneur talent,
if talent is inversely correlated with education.
Note that experience was substantially more important for those entrepreneurs that borrowed the initial
funds for their enterprise start-up, with males presenting much higher returns to experience than females,
15,5% versus 8.6%. A possible explanation of this e®ect is that family and friends might be using this
information as the screening criteria before giving a loan. An implication, is that young individuals, naturally
with less experience, would have a tougher time to obtain funds.
Another very interesting result if the return to capital. Borrowers presented strickenly higher returns to
assets than the the other two groups of entrepreneurs, 77% versus 14% and 16%. More interesting, females
presented an even higher return to physical assets than males. This result might suggest that the informal
screening, monitoring and enforcing mechanisms used by family and friends might be operating quite well.
Given that they were able to identify the entrepreneurs with the highest returns to assets.
Table 1: Returns to Human and Physical Capital: OLS
Full sample Only females Only males
Self Loan Noneed Self Loan Noneed Self Loan Noneed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
educ .034 .033 .053 .053 .041 .067 .026 .019 .008
(.004)¤¤¤ (.014)¤¤ (.013)¤¤¤ (.008)¤¤¤ (.019)¤¤ (.014)¤¤¤ (.005)¤¤¤ (.023) (.024)
exp .033 .088 .018 .035 .097 .038 .035 .138 .042
(.005)¤¤¤ (.018)¤¤¤ (.019) (.008)¤¤¤ (.024)¤¤¤ (.022)¤ (.006)¤¤¤ (.057)¤¤ (.02)¤¤
expsq -.0007 -.002 0 -.0007 -.002 -.001 -.0008 -.01 -.0002
(.0002)¤¤¤ (.0007)¤¤¤ (.0007) (.0003)¤¤¤ (.0009)¤¤¤ (.0007)¤¤ (.0002)¤¤¤ (.005)¤¤ (.0005)
asset 0.137 0.769 0.166 0.086 0.665 0.045 0.119 0.584 -1.988
(£10;000) (0.024)¤¤¤ (0.243)¤¤¤ (0.403) (0.058) (0.404)¤ (0.300) (0.026)¤¤¤ (0.343)¤ (0.683)¤¤¤
assetsq -3.94e-7 -2.70e-5 -2.56e-6 1.71e-6 -2.27e-5 -6.82e-7 -4.59e-7 -1.61e-5 1.63e-4
(1.48e-7)¤¤¤ (8.37e-6)¤¤¤ (9.50e-6) (5.20e-7)¤¤¤ (1.52e-5) (7.79e-6) (1.53e-7)¤¤¤ (1.05e-5) (3.50e-5)¤¤¤
e(N) 3111 363 350 1266 254 263 1845 109 87
e(r2-a) .207 .186 .162 .202 .151 .127 .158 .188 .211
e(F) 34.533 5.405 . 14.445 3.012 . 16.164 4.688 .
Standard errors in parentheses;
Signi¯cance levels:*:10% **:5% ***:1%.
Note: Constant, age, female, sec2, sec3, training, registr, account, hours, days omitted
Source:PCBR-Est
Credit
The mean e®ect of having taken a loan in the past 12 months was positive and statistically signi¯cant,
with a magnitude of almost 24%. However, this result was not persistent across the di®erent quantiles, being
much greater (and statistically signi¯cant) for those individuals at the highest quantiles of the conditional
earnings distribution.
27See Ghatak (1999) for a theoretical discussion of ¯nancial contracts with such characteristics
13It is impossible to claim any causality out of this ¯nding given the widely known potential sources
selectivity in this context. The ¯rst source is related to the entrepreneurs behavior and their respective
degrees of risk aversion. It is reasonable to assume that only those entrepreneurs who are less risk averse
will self-select themselves to take credit. The second source is related to the screening mechanism which
operates in virtually all lending operation (formal and informal), with the objective to screen out the
borrowers with a high probability of default.
Another source of selectivity, might be hidden ability and perseverance that might be captured through
this variable, given the numerus hurdles that these entrepreneurs probably managed to overcome in order
to obtain such a loan. Thus, the higher returns of those entrepreneurs that have taken credit might not only
capture the e®ect of the loan, but also re°ect the higher returns associated with riskier activities, or a very
e®ective screening mechanisms, which are only providing credit to the top of the heap, or the entrepreneurs
innate abilities, or more probably, a combination of all the above.
Another interesting ¯nding is the the interaction between credit and investment presented a negative
coe±cient (note that the F¡test for the joint signi¯cance of the coe±cient credit, expansion and their
interaction) was statistically signi¯cant for the OLS, and the 50th, 75th and 90th quantiles (Fig5r and
Fig5s). Note that this e®ect was also present on Table 3, which used pro¯t as the dependent variable.
One possible explanation for this e®ect is again the e®ort problem suggested by the Aghion and Bolton
and Lehnert model, given that entrepreneurs that took credit and invested performed substantially worse
than those the simply self-¯nanced their physical capital expansion in the past 12 months, the e®ort level
of the latter group was much greater than that of the constrained entrepreneurs that had to borrow funds
in order to ¯nance their investment.
Liquidity constraint
Taking all entrepreneurs that stated that `lack of funds' was one of their main di±culties as a group of
`credit constrained' entrepreneurs, we were able to create the variable `lack' (this is equivalent to coe±cient
Ci in Equation (9)). This coe±cient can be interpreted as a the explicit e®ect of `credit constraint' on
entrepreneurs earnings. On average these entrepreneurs presented earnings 6.5% smaller them the remaining
entrepreneurs, suggesting that `credit constraints', as de¯ned here, had a negative and statistically signi¯cant
e®ect on the entrepreneurs earnings.
As mentioned in Section 3 we also included in our model an interaction term between being credit
constrained and having taken a long in the past 12 months. This factor should only takes into account those
individuals that are credit worthy and who complain about lack of funds. This variable presented a negative
and statistically signi¯cant e®ect on the draw, suggesting that being liquidity constraint had a particularly
negative and signi¯cant on the draw of those entrepreneurs that were credit worthy (23%).
Note also that both e®ects presented higher e®ects on the 50th, 75th and 90th quantiles (Fig5v and Fig5w).
This ¯nding can be explained by Evans and Jovanovic model which predicts that liquidity constraint will
be more binding as the size of the enterprise increases.
Table 2: Earnings Equation: Draw
ols quant10 quant25 quant50 quant75 quant90
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
educ .036 .045 .035 .034 .033 .031
(.004)¤¤¤ (.011)¤¤¤ (.006)¤¤¤ (.004)¤¤¤ (.003)¤¤¤ (.006)¤¤¤
exp .034 .077 .044 .037 .027 .027
(.005)¤¤¤ (.012)¤¤¤ (.006)¤¤¤ (.007)¤¤¤ (.004)¤¤¤ (.005)¤¤¤
expsq -.0007 -.001 0 -.0009 -.0006 -.0005
(.0002)¤¤¤ (.0006)¤¤¤ (.0002)¤¤¤ (.0003)¤¤¤ (.0002)¤¤¤ (.0002)¤¤¤
age -.002 -.001 -.002 -.001 -.001 -.002
(.001)¤¤¤ (.003) (.002) (.001)¤ (.001) (.002)¤¤
female -.294 -.312 -.328 -.333 -.316 -.262
(.027)¤¤¤ (.075)¤¤¤ (.041)¤¤¤ (.028)¤¤¤ (.03)¤¤¤ (.042)¤¤¤
asset (£10;000) 0.143 0.082 0.116 0.183 0.163 0.174
(0.024)¤¤¤ (0.098) (0.052)¤¤ (0.039)¤¤¤ (0.035)¤¤¤ (0.042)¤¤¤
assetsq -3.94e-11 1.05e-10 1.45e-11 -5.08e-11 -6.38e-11 -7.90e-11
(1.54e-11)¤¤ (1.07e-10) (7.14e-11) (4.65e-11) (4.21e-11) (2.43e-11)¤¤¤
renda .0001 .0002 .0002 .0001 .0001 .0001
(.00005)¤¤¤ (.0001) (.00005)¤¤¤ (.00003)¤¤¤ (.00005)¤¤ (.00008)
cred1 .242 -.04 .151 .196 .335 .311
(.079)¤¤¤ (.201) (.102) (.077)¤¤ (.072)¤¤¤ (.084)¤¤¤
Continued on next page...
14... table 2 continued
ols quant10 quant25 quant50 quant75 quant90
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
-IexpXcred1-1 -.154 -.395 -.279 -.049 -.207 -.268
(.14) (.485) (.188) (.123) (.205) (.185)
stpf2 -.16 .004 -.082 -.099 -.102 -.123
(.037)¤¤¤ (.116) (.049)¤ (.043)¤¤ (.033)¤¤¤ (.048)¤¤¤
stpf3 -.109 -.034 -.086 -.083 -.088 -.099
(.037)¤¤¤ (.084) (.045)¤ (.047)¤ (.04)¤¤ (.049)¤¤
lack -.065 -.109 -.02 -.035 -.046 -.07
(.031)¤¤ (.097) (.043) (.032) (.031) (.036)¤¤
-IcreXlack-1 -.23 .132 -.097 -.159 -.256 -.149
(.125)¤ (.505) (.18) (.201) (.143)¤ (.146)
e(N) 3824 3824 3824 3824 3824 3824
e(r2-a) .213 . . . . .
e(F) 39.498 . . . . .
p¡value
1 0.000 0.902 0.053 0.000 0.007 0.000
p¡value
2 0.001 0.454 0.605 0.096 0.000 0.033
Standard errors in parentheses;
Signi¯cance levels:*:10% **:5% ***:1%.
p¡value
1: p¡value of the joint signi¯cance of credit, expansion and their interaction
p¡value
2: p¡value of the joint signi¯cance of credit, lack and their interaction
Note: sec2, sec3, training, registr, account, hours, days, dist and expansion omitted
Source:PCBR-Est
Table 3: Earnings Equation: Net Pro¯t
ols quant50 quant75 quant90
(1) (4) (5) (6)
educ .052 .036 .024 .027
(.033) (.018)¤¤ (.006)¤¤¤ (.009)¤¤¤
exp .071 .052 .026 .019
(.037)¤ (.028)¤ (.009)¤¤¤ (.007)¤¤¤
expsq -.001 0 -.0004 -.0004
(.001)¤ (.001) (.0002)¤¤¤ (.0002)¤¤
age -.004 .005 -.002 -.002
(.01) (.006) (.002) (.002)¤
female -.437 -.299 -.351 -.261
(.216)¤¤ (.141)¤¤ (.076)¤¤¤ (.055)¤¤¤
asset (£10;000) 0.079 -0.346 0.160 0.308
(0.263) (0.551) (0.132) (0.130)¤¤
assetsq 1.50e-10 8.77e-10 1.79e-10 -1.49e-10
(1.87e-10) (1.87e-09) (1.95e-10) (7.67e-11)¤
renda 0 .0002 .0001 .0001
(.0004) (.0003) (.0001) (.00009)
cred1 1.317 -.084 .572 1.313
(.804) (.572) (.732) (.426)¤¤¤
-IexpXcred1-1 -2.142 -1.534 -.59 -1.07
(1.218)¤ (.993) (.997) (.382)¤¤¤
stpf2 -.439 -.332 -.16 -.122
(.342) (.197)¤ (.057)¤¤¤ (.062)¤¤
stpf3 -.096 -.395 -.179 -.084
(.251) (.092)¤¤¤ (.051)¤¤¤ (.041)¤¤
lack -1.288 -.573 -.212 -.183
(.277)¤¤¤ (.145)¤¤¤ (.066)¤¤¤ (.052)¤¤¤
-IcreXlack-1 .71 1.946 .75 -.191
(1.317) (1.707) (1.099) (.536)
e(N) 3824 3824 3824 3824
e(r2-a) .019 . . .
e(F) 4.051 . . .
p¡value
1 0.028 0.053 0.000 0.000
p¡value
2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses;
Signi¯cance levels:*:10% **:5% ***:1%.
p¡value
1: p¡value of the joint signi¯cance of credit, expansion and their interaction
Continued on next page...
15... table 3 continued
ols quant50 quant75 quant90
(1) (4) (5) (6)
p¡value
2: p¡value of the joint signi¯cance of credit, lack and their interaction
Note: sec2, sec3, training, registr, account, hours, days, dist and expansion omitted
Source:PCBR-Est
6 Conclusion:
Several economic models have described the theoretical causes and consequences of `credit rationing' and
`under-investment'. Using micro-level data from entrepreneurs in the slums of Rio de Janeiro, we have
provided some empirical evidence for such models.
Our empirical model shows that controlling for a set of observable characteristics related to human
capital theory, demographics and enterprise characteristics, the entrepreneurs who were able to self-¯nance
their business start-up with previously accumulated wealth have, on average, earnings around 16% to 11%
greater those that have to borrow funds and those that did not need any seed money. It is worth mentioning
that the average entrepreneur has been operating the same business for over 6 years, which for Brazilian
micro enterprise standards is a quite long time, and help us to highlight the fact that we are not looking at
short term e®ects.
Those entrepreneurs that were `credit constrained' also presented a worse performance (an average e®ect
of 6.5% on draw). This e®ect of even greater for those entrepreneurs that were credit constrained and who
were credit worthy, given that the interaction term between these two factors presented a negative and
statistically signi¯cant e®ect of 23%.
Bother factors seem to increase earnings inequality, given their more prominent e®ects on the higher
quantiles of the conditional earnings distribution.
In terms of human capital, the work showed that education and experience can have a potentially
important role on reducing earnings inequality, give their greater e®ects on lower quantiles.
This work provide evidence that initial wealth plays an important role on the entrepreneurs earnings,
showing that those that are able to self-¯nance their start-up are able to operate larger enterprises thus
earning more. In addition, entrepreneurs that claim to be credit constrained to perform worse than their
counterparts. An important remark on this interpretation is the possible impact of omitted variable bias
on the results presented. If high entrepreneurial ability individuals are over-represented in low schooling
levels (because these individuals realize at a very early age that formal education would not help them, then
not considering ability di®erences would wrongly lead to an overestimate(underestimate) of the returns to
schooling at lower (upper) part of the conditional distributions.
Among other important results is a strong and statistically signi¯cant neighborhood e®ect on the en-
trepreneurs performance, with, all else constant, the average earnings varying 14% from the poorest to the
wealthiest neighborhood.
As well as a strong gender discrimination, with female entrepreneurs earnings 32% less than males on
the lowest quantiles of the earning distribution. The factors presented smaller, although still negative and
statistically signi¯cant e®ects on the higher quantiles.
Both ¯ndings have important policy implications, since they highlight the imperfection of the credit
market in the Brazilian economy, and demonstrate its perversive e®ects on increasing inequality among
entrepreneurs.
An important agenda for future research is the investigation of the long-run e®ects of this initial wealth
on business start-up. Such work is crucial in order to understand if such initial endowment inequalities
increase or decrease over time. The use of continuous measures of both initial wealth and credit constraint,
can also be instrumental in order to understand if such factors present decreasing or increasing e®ects on
earnings.
References
AciolyJr., C. (2001). Reviewing urban revitalization strategies in rio de janeiro: from urban project to urban
managment approaches. Geoforum 32, 509{520.
16Aghion, P. and P. Bolton (1997). A trickle-down theory of growth and development with debt overhang.
Review of Economic Studies 64, 151{172.
Aghion, P., E. Caroli, and C. Garca-Pealosa (1999, December). Inequality and economic growth: The
perspective of the new groth theories. Journal of Economic Literature 37, 1615{1660.
Arabsheibani, G. R., F. G. Carneiro, and A. Henley (2002). Human capital and earnings inequality in brazil
1988-1998: Quantile regression evidence. Paper presented at the 2002 EALE Conference.
Azevedo, J. P. W. (2004). An investigation of the labour market earnings in deprived areas: Evaluating
the sources of wage inequality between formal and informal sector workers in the slums of rio de janeiro.
mimeo.
Banerjee, A. V. and A. F. Newman (1993). Occupational choice and the process of development. Journal
of Political Economy 101(2), 274{98.
Bardhan, P. (1982). Agrarian class formation in india. Journal of Peasant Studies 10, 73{94.
Becker, G. S. (1964). Human capital : a theoretical and empirical analysis,with special reference to education.
New York: Columbia University Press for National Bureau of Economic Research.
Cira, D. A. (2002). Urban upgrading in latin america and the caribbean. En Breve - World Bank (3).
Corral, L. and T. Reardon (2001). Rural nonfarm incomes in nicaragua. World Development 29(3), 427{42.
De Soto, H. (1989). The other path : the invisible revolution in the Third World (1st ed.). New York:
Harper & Row.
Escobal, J. (2001). The determinants of nonfarm income diversi¯cation in rural peru. World Develop-
ment 29(3), 497{508.
Eswaran, M. and A. Kotwal (1989). Credit and agrarian class structure. In P. K. Bardhan (Ed.), The
Economic theory of agrarian institutions, pp. 166{184. Oxford [England]: Clarendon Press ;.
Evans, D. S. and B. Jovanovic (1989). An estimated model of entrepreneurial choice under liquidity con-
straints. Journal of Political Economy 97, 808{27.
Ferreira, F. H. G. and P. Lanjouw (2001). Rural nonfarm activities and poverty in the brazilian northeast.
World Development 29(3), 509{28.
Ghatak, M. (1999). Group lending contracts and the peer selection e®ect. Journal of Development Eco-
nomics 60(1), 27{50.
Ghatak, M. and N. Jiang (2002). A simple model of inequality, occuaptional choice, and development.
Journal of Development Economics 69, 205{226.
GrazianodaSilva, J. and M. E. Del Grossi (2001). Rural nonfarm employment and incomes in brazil: Patterns
and evolution. World Development 29(3), 443{53.
Hamilton, B. H. (2000). Does entrepreneurship pay? an empirical analysis of the returns of self-employment.
Journal of Political Economy 108(3), 604{631.
IBGE (2000). Brazilian census. Technical report, Brazilian National O±ce of Statistics.
IBGE (2003). Estatsticas do Sculo XX. IBGE.
Koenker, R. and J. Bassett, Gilbert (1982). Robust tests for heteroscedasticity based on regression quantiles.
Econometrica 50(1), 43{61.
Koenker, R. W. and J. Bassett, Gilbert (1978). Regression quantiles. Econometrica 46(1), 33{50.
Kutner, M. H., C. J. Nachtschiem, and W. W. Neter (1990). Applied Linear Statistical Models (3rd ed.).
Irwin.
LabGeo (1996a). Mapa digital das favelas do municpio do rio de janeiro.
LabGeo (1996b). Mapa digital dos bairros do municpio do rio de janeiro.
Lanjouw, P. (2001). Nonfarm employment and poverty in rural el salvador. World Development 29(3),
529{47.
Lazear, E. P. (2003). Entrepreneurship. Technical report, IZA Discussion Paper Series no.706.
Le, A. T. (1999). Empirical studies of self-employment. Journal of Economic Surveys 13(4), 381{416.
Lehnert, A. (1998). Asset pooling, credit rationing, and growth. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System.
Martins, P. S. and P. T. Pereira (2004). Does education reduces wage inequality? quantile regression
evidence from 16 countries. Labour Economics 11, 355{371.
Mesnard, A. and M. Ravallion (2001). Is inequality bad for business? a nonlinear microeconomics model of
wealth e®ects on self-employment.
Mesnard, A. and M. Ravallion (2003). Wealth distribution and self-employment in a developing economy.
Mincer, J. (1958). Investiment in humam capital and personal income distribution. Journal of Political
Economy 56, 281{302.
17Mincer, J. (1974). Schooling, experience and earnings. Technical report, National Bureu of Economics
Research.
Parker, S. C. (2004). The Economics of Self-Employment and Entrepreneurship. Cambride: Cambrdige
University Press.
Paulson, A. L. and R. Townsend (2002). The nature of ¯nancial constrains: Distinghishing the micro
underpinings of macro models.
Pero, V., G. Quintaes, and A. Arpon (2004). Renda, pobreza e desigualdade no Rio de Janeiro: um balano
da dcada de 90.
Pitt, M. M. and S. R. Khandker (1998). The impact of group-based credit programs on poor households in
bangladesh: Does the gender of participants matter? Journal of Political Economy 106(5), 958{996.
Psacharopoulos, G. and H. A. Patrinos (2004, forthcoming). Returns to investiment in education: A further
update. Education Economics.
Reardon, T., J. A. Berdegue, and G. Escobar (2001). Rural nonfarm employment and incomes in latin
america: Overview and policy implications. World Development 29(3), 395{409.
Riley, E., J. Fiori, and R. Ramirez (2001). Favela bairro and a new generation of housing programmes.
Geoforum 32, 521{531.
Robinson, M. S. (2001). The Micro¯nance Revolution. World Bank.
Ruben, R. and M. van den Berg (2001). Nonfarm employment and poverty alleviation of rural farm house-
holds in honduras. World Development 29(3), 549{60.
Schoenberg, S. (2000). Micro¯nance prospects in brazil.
Silva, D. B., J. M. Lima, and P. L. Quintslr (1998). A socio-economics survey for job and income development
in rio de janeiro slums. In Proceedings of the Joint IASS/IAOS Conference: Statistics for Economics and
Social Development, pp. 9.
Smith, P. A. and M. R. Metzger (1998). The return to education: Street vendor in mexico. World Devel-
opment 26(2), 289{296.
Teilhet-Waldorf, S. and W. H. Waldor (1983). Earnings of self-employed in an informal sector: A case study
of bangkok. Economic Development and Cultural Change 31(3), 587{607.
Tejerina, L. (2003). Entrepreneurship and ¯nancial constrains: The case of nicaragua.
UN-HABITAT (2003). The challenge of slums - global report on human settlements 2003. Technical report.
Van Der Sluis, J., M. Van Praag, and W. Vijverberg (2003). Entrepreneurship selection and performance:
A meta-analysis of the impact of education in industrialized countries.
Wydick, B. (1999). Credit access, human capital and class structure mobility. Journal of Development
Studies 35(6), 131{52.
Yunez-Naude, A. and J. E. Taylor (2001). The determinants of nonfarm activities and incomes of rural
households in mexico, with emphasis on education. World Development 29(3), 561{72.
Appendix




asset Enterprise Physical Assets








resdpart Resident Partners (cat.)
busloc Business Location
bustate Business State Situation
raw expenses with Raw Materials
employee expenses with employees
social expenses with employees Social Security
rentsta expenses with State Rent
rentmch expenses with Machinery Rent
Continued on next page...
18... table 4 continued
Variable Description
fuel expenses with Fuel
utilities expenses with Public Utilities
taxes expenses with Taxes
other Other expenses
registr Lack of Registration
account Lack of Account Controls
labour Number of employees
female Female







stup¯n Start up Finance
stpf1 stup¯n==Own
stpf2 stup¯n==Loan
stpf3 stup¯n==Did not need
resid Residence
credit Took Credit
cred1 credit==Yes, in the past 12 months
cred2 credit==No
cred3 credit==Yes, more than a year
source Credit Source
¯n1 source==Friend and/or Relative
¯n2 source==Commercial Banks and other Formal Financial Institutions
¯n3 source==Churches, Associations and Other Organizations
¯n4 source==Individuals who are not relatives
¯n5 source==Other
cap Capital as motivation
bad Business did not performa well in the past 12 months
hours Hours per day
days Days per week
lack Lack of Funding
IcreXlack 1 (cred1==1)*lack
expansion Expanded in the past 12 months
IexpXcred1 1 (expansion==1)*cred1





motiv Motivation to Entrepreneurship












capital8 capital==Did not need
capital9 capital==Other
19Table 5: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
pro¯t 50.127 325.01 -1868.426 1954.473 4191
draw 327.737 288.41 0 1929.582 4191
asset 3466.783 12089.977 0 300000 4191
sec1 0.077 0.266 0 1 4168
sec2 0.328 0.47 0 1 4168
sec3 0.595 0.491 0 1 4168
dexp 0.566 0.496 0 1 4187
bussadv 0.031 0.172 0 1 4186
training 0.032 0.177 0 1 4184
partner 1.131 0.358 1 3 4150
resdpart 1.131 0.358 1 3 4150
busloc 1.628 0.717 1 4 4186
bustate 1.271 0.589 1 3 4181
raw 0.888 0.316 0 1 4191
employee 0.969 0.175 0 1 4191
social 0.107 0.31 0 1 4191
rentsta 0.117 0.322 0 1 4191
rentmch 0.04 0.196 0 1 4191
fuel 0.09 0.287 0 1 4191
utilities 0.332 0.471 0 1 4190
taxes 0.023 0.15 0 1 4191
other 0.164 0.37 0 1 4191
registr 0.952 0.214 0 1 4181
account 0.46 0.498 0 1 4176
labour 0.47 0.939 0 31 4191
female 0.458 0.498 0 1 4188
educ 6.246 3.492 0 12 4184
agect 2.979 0.78 1 4 4191
age 41.999 11.33 15 65 3956
agesq 1892.283 969.188 225 4225 3956
exp 5.69 7.402 0 60 4187
expsq 87.154 239.635 0 3600 4187
stpf1 0.816 0.388 0 1 4173
stpf2 0.092 0.289 0 1 4173
stpf3 0.092 0.29 0 1 4173
resid 0.915 0.279 0 1 4184
cred1 0.075 0.264 0 1 4191
cred2 0.884 0.321 0 1 4191
cred3 0.041 0.198 0 1 4191
¯n1 0.192 0.394 0 1 484
¯n2 0.690 0.463 0 1 484
¯n3 0.006 0.079 0 1 484
¯n4 0.072 0.259 0 1 484
¯n5 0.039 0.194 0 1 484
hours 9.435 2.982 1 20 4178
days 6.352 1.184 1 7 4186
cap 0.038 0.191 0 1 4183
bad 0.023 0.148 0 1 4177
expansion 0.126 0.332 0 1 4177
IcreXexpan 1 0.016 0.125 0 1 4177
lack 0.222 0.416 0 1 4191
IcreXlack 1 0.019 0.138 0 1 4191
time 6.17 8.166 0 99 4191
prev1 0.351 0.477 0 1 4191
prev2 0.169 0.375 0 1 4191
prev3 0.48 0.5 0 1 4191
motiv1 0.201 0.401 0 1 4183
motiv2 0.351 0.477 0 1 4183
motiv3 0.212 0.409 0 1 4183
motiv4 0.236 0.425 0 1 4183
capital 3.726 1.889 1 9 4184
capital1 0.171 0.376 0 1 4184
capital2 0.024 0.153 0 1 4184
capital3 0.225 0.418 0 1 4184
capital4 0.392 0.488 0 1 4184
capital5 0.076 0.264 0 1 4184
capital6 0.003 0.056 0 1 4184
capital7 0.013 0.113 0 1 4184
capital8 0.092 0.289 0 1 4184



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5: Quantile Regression: Draw Partial Derivative
22